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CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN INDENTURE TRUSTEE
AND BONDHOLDERS: AVOIDANCE OF "NO ACTION"
CLAUSES PROHIBITING BONDHOLDER SUITS
AGAINST THE OBLIGOR*
CORPORATIONS issuing bonds frequently insert "no action" clauses in the
underlying indenture agreement with bondholders.' Under the "no action"
clause, bondholders' rights to sue the corporate debtor are vested in an
independent trustee ;2 bondholders may not sue the corporation unless the
*Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp.,--Mkisc.-, 111 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
1. Mr. Gerald J. O'Leary, Assistant Director of the Division of Corporate Finance
of the S.E.C. stated that "although no attempt has been made to keep a record of [no
action clauses] ... it is a rare indenture which does not include them." Communication
to the YAS.E LAw JouNaL, Feb. 24, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
2. The "no action" clause has been upheld on the theory that bondholders have by
agreement among themselves imposed a condition precedent to the exercise of the right
of any individual bondholder to sue. Dietzel v. Anger, 8 Cal.2d 373, 376, 65 P.2d 8 03,
805 (1937). Contra: In re A. J. Ellis, 242 Fed. 156, 160 (D.N.J. 1917) (mere right to
sue cannot be vested in one who has no legal or equitable interest in claim sued upon).
Courts may uphold the clause even where the obligor is trustee, controls the trustee,
or is under common control with the trustee, e.g., Freed v. Marburger, 353 Mo. 1146, 186
SAV.2d 584, 587-8 (1945). But cf., Townsend v. Milaca Motors Co., 194 Minn. 426, 260
NAV. 525 (1935). The trustee is usually completely independent of the obligor either be-
cause of legislative requirements, see text at notes 44, 54, infra, or because courts may
otherwise be hostile toward the obligor in construing the clause. For general discussion
of the theory of "no action" clauses, see STEENS, Co ToIMoNs 922-35 (2d ed. 1949) ;
Posner, The Trustee and the Trust Indenture: A Further Study, 46 YALE L.J. 737 (1937).
In the absence of specific provisions, "no action" clauses are generally interpreted as
prohibiting only actions on the security itself, since the right to sue is essential to negoti-
ability. See, e.g., Oswianza v. ,Vengler & 'Meindel, 358 IlL 302, 305, 193 N.E. 123, 124
(1934) ; Bullowa v. Thermoid Co., 114 N.J.L. 205, 176 Ad. 596 (1935); Miller v. Cor-
vallis Hospital Ass'n, 182 Ore. 18, 185 P.2d 549 (1947). However, terms on the face of
the bonds and in the indenture may prohibit suits by the bondholders even on the matured
obligation. Note, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 1082 (1935). Since the passage of the Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, no restrictions in the indenture are permitted upon the rights of bond-
holders to sue for their interest and principal when due unless holders of at least seventy-
five percent in principal amount of indenture securities consent to a postponement of the
due date of the interests payments. TRUST IND=NTU=E Acr § 316(a) (2), 53 STAT. 1172
(1939), 15 U.S.C. §77ppp(a)(2) (1946). See Loss, SEcunmrr RF-uLAnio:.s 434-5
(1951); Goodbar, Bond Trustees as Statutory Trustees, 28 B.U.L. REv. 399, 418-21
(1948). But cf. Haas v. Palace Hotel Co. of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App2d 10, 224
P.2d 783 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 813 (1951). Also see Sm.. RE'. No. 248, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26-7 (1939).
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trustee fails to act 3 after holders of a specified amount of indenture securities 4
make written request upon the trustee for action and offer the trustee in-
demnity for its expenses.0 At the same time, the trustee is obligated, at threat
of removal or personal liability,6 to police the bondholders' interests: the
indenture may impose affirmative duties on the trustee such as authentication
of the bonds 7 or recordation of mortgages ;8 and the trustee is expected to
take action on its own initiative as, for example, in obtaining payment for
the bondholders where the debtor defaults in interest payments or on the
matured obligation.9 Purposes of the "no action" clause are manifold. Since
the trustee represents the bondholders as a class, whatever steps are taken
in dealing with the debtor will presumably be in the interest of all the bond-
holders.10 Thus the "no action" clause precludes specious suits instigated by
attorneys who hope to receive lucrative fees from a true class action for all
bondholders." And the debtor corporation is insulated from unwise court
action by a few panicky bondholders,'12 or from a possible multiplicity of suits
3. King v. Finch, 43 Cal. App.2d 831, 111 P.2d 711 (1941); Thomason v. Krasa,
292 Ill. App. 174, 10 N.E.2d 710 (1937). Cf. Holl v. Levin, 273 Ill. App. 514 (1934);
Pacific States Say. & Loan Co. v. Hollywood Knickerbocker, Inc., 11 Cal. App.2d 56,
52 P.2d 1014 (1935).
4. Section 316(a) (1) of The Trust Indenture Act places a limit of fifty-one percent
on the holders in principal amount of indenture securities required to request the trustee
to act. 53 STAT. 1172 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (1946). In issues not covered by thuis
Act, there seems to be no limit on the percentage required. E.g., Goodjon v. United Bond
& Bldg. Corp., 226 App. Div. 137, 234 N.Y. Supp. 522 (4th Dep't 1929) (75%); Fro-
bisher v. Tudor Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 470, 168 Atl. 855 (1933) (51%). However, the great
majority of these clauses have a 25 percent limit. See cases cited 108 A.L.R. 88 (1937),
174 A.L.R. 436 (1948).
5. See 2 BoGERT, TRuSTS & TRusTEs § 246 (1953).
6. See text at notes 56, 57 injra.
7. Authentication of bonds merely attests to their genuineness but not to the priority
or quality of the security. Thus no burden of investigation is placed upon the trustee.
Continental Corp. v. First National Bank of Westfield, 285 Mass. 419, 189 N.E. 184
(1934). However, trustee is liable for negligent, unauthorized authentication. Doyle v.
Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
8. Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 134 Misc. 727, 236 N.Y. Supp. 36, aff'd Tvitout
opinion, 218 App. Div. 767, 218 N.Y. Supp. 701 (1st Dep't 1926). However, the trustee
is not liable for a failure to record unless expressly authorized to do so by the indenture.
Bell v. Title Trust & Guarantee Co., 292 Pa. 228, 140 Atl. 900 (1928).
9. E.g., Driscoll v. Fitch, 52 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ; Smith v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 320 Pa. 412, 183 At. 47 (1936); Posner, The Trustee and the Trust Indenture: A
Further Study, 46 YALE L.J. 737, 765-6 (1937).
10. See Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123
Fla. 525, 538, 167 So. 378, 383 (1936).
11. Home Mortgage Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F.2d 738, 744 (4th Cir. 1931).
12. Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins, Co., 123 Fla.
525, 539, 167 So. 378, 384 (1936) ; Haas v. Palace Hotel Co. of San Francisco, 101 Cal.
App.2d 108, 121, 224 P.2d 783, 790 (1950), cert. denicd, 342 U.S. 137 (1951) ; Note, 27
COL. L. REv. 443, 579 (1927).
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engendered by individual bondholders' actions.' 3 Finally, since responsibility
for enforcing the indenture rests with the independent trustee, the need for
individual bondholder's vigilance is reduced.
Despite the "no action" clause, courts occasionally permit bondholders to
sue the debtor corporation directly without complying wvith the provisions of
the clause. Situations may arise where it is obvious that the trustee, even if
requested, will not or cannot represent the bondholders. The trustee may,
for example, be acting in bad faith 14 or may be outside the country.15 In
other cases, especially where bonds are negotiable on their face, it may be
difficult or even impossible for a bondholder with a legitimate complaint to
ascertain, in time, the names and addresses of other present bondholders who
might be willing to join in a request for trustee actic'. 16 In any event, in
occasional circumstances, insistence on literal compliance with the "no action"
13. See Rodman v. Richfield Oil Co., 66 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1933); Dietzel v.
Anger, 8 Cal.2d 373, 376, 65 P.2d 803, 805 (1937) ; Steffen & Russell, The Mcgolfaillty
of Corporate Bonds, 41 YAm.u L.J. 799, 811 (1932).
14. E.g., First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Ricketts, 75 F.2d 309 (Sth Cir. 1934) (bad
faith in failing to notify bondholders that obligor had failed and had deeded property to
trustee) ; Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254 Fed. 560 (Sth Cir. 1918) (trustee
and majority bondholders conspiring against minority); O'Beirne v. Allegheny & K.R.R.,
151 N.Y. 372, 45 N.E. 873 (1897) (unreasonable refusal to sue) ; Campbell v. Hudson
& 'Manhattan R.R., 277 App. Div. 731, 102 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1st Dep't 1951) (trustee's bad
faith in abdicating its functions); Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 6S9 (Sup. Ct. 1942)
(bad faith in refusing to sue debtor based on an analogy of a stockholder's derivative
action); Buel v. Baltimore & O.S.,VW. Ry., 24 'Misc. 646, 53 N.Y. Supp. 749 (Sup. Ct.
1898) (trustee aiding liens junior to the issue under whose indenture it is trustee) ; First
National Bank -. Brynwood Land Co., 245 Wis. 610, 15 N.W.2d S40 (1944) (trustee
owner of majority of bonds and stocks of obligor and was conspiring against the
minority).
15. Ettlinger v. Schumacher, 142 N.Y. 189, 36 N.E. 1055 (1594) (trustee abroad and
probably insane); but cf., Moore v. Tumwater Paper Mills Co., 181 Wash. 45, 42 P2d
29, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 597 (1935) (trustee not licensed in that state and license wras a
condition precedent to legal action).
Bondholders may also be permitted to bring a direct suit where the trustee cannot
take action until requested by the holders of a certain percentage of the securities, and
because of the conspiracy or control by a larger group, the minority are unable to meet
the condition precedent in order to request action by the trustee. See, Weir v. Bauer, 75
Utah 498, 519, 286 Pac. 936, 944 (1930).
16. See Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 689, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1942), in which the court
permitted evidence to be introduced that since the bonds were payable to the bearer, it
was impossible to locate their owners. The bondholder's plight is increased by "ostrich
clauses," under which the trustee can conclusively presume that there has been no default
until informed by holders of a specified percentage of bonds. However, bondholders are
assisted by §312 of the Trust Indenture Act which provides that the obligor shall furnish
the trustee with the names and addresses of the bondholders at six month intervals or
upon the trustee's request. The trustee must afford access to these lists to any three
individuals who have been bondholders for more than six months. 53 ST.AT. 1164 (1939),
15 U.S.C. § 77111 (1946). See SEx. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 23 (1939);
Loss, op. cit. mtpra note 2, at 431.
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clause might completely paralyze bondholders whose interests are being
harmed. Consequently, courts have sought to protect bondholders by allow-
ing them to sue the corporation directly. In some cases the action against
the corporation has been sustained by a strict construction of the indenture
agreement in order to limit the coverage of the "no action" clause.11 But
even if the clause is found technically applicable, courts still permit direct
suits in the form of a class action in the right of the trustee if the trustee
is acting fraudulently or in bad faith,' 8 or in some situations when the trustee
17. Where the bonds and the trust agreement were prepared by the issuer, any doubt-
ful language therein is interpreted strictly against the issuer. Perry v. Darlington Fire-
proofing Co., 76 Ohio App. 101, 63 N.E.2d 222 (1945) ; Miller v. Corvallis General I-os-
pital Ass'n, 182 Ore. 18, 33, 185 P.2d 549, 555 (1947). At least one court has expressed
the view that an action to protect the security by way of an injunction is outside the "no
action" clause, since the equitable remedy amounts neither to the collection of the bonds
nor the enforcement of the securing deed. Also outside the scope of the clauses are suits
seeking damage for unlawful diversion or threatened diversion of the mortgaged property
or its income, for equitable relief to conserve the security for ultimate redemption of the
bonds, to restore the value of impairment to the security, and to remove the trustee for
breach of trust. Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,
123 Fla. 525, 535-6, 167 So. 378, 382-3 (1936). But cf. Dietzel v. Anger, 8 Cal.2d 373
377, 65 P.2d 803, 805 (1937) (denying right of bondholders to enforce stockholder's lia-
bility).
Moreover, certain terms in the indenture may be unenforceable unless notice is given
the bondholders on the face of the bonds as to the restrictive provisions. Two major
states, New York and Illinois, frequently permit direct suit by strict requirements of
adequate notice to the bondholders on the face of the bonds in regard to restrictions on
bondholder rights of action contained in the indenture. E.g., Oswianzo v. Wengler &
Mardell, 358 Ill. 302, 193 N.E. 123 (1934) (permitting action at law upon the bonds) ;
Medivin v. 11 West 42nd Street, 261 App. Div. 721, 27 N.Y.S.2d 551, appeal denied, 262
App. Div. 921, 29 N.Y.S.2d 910 (3d Dep't 1941) (action on interest coupons); Van
Wormer v. Two Park Ave. Bldg., 65 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd without opinion,
271 App. Div. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1st Dep't 1947) (suit on principal obligation arising
under plan of reorganization and not under the indenture) ; Regan v. Prudence Co., 17
N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (permitting action against directors of issuer for mis-
management where bonds have matured); Deutsch v. Gutehoffnungshutte, Aktienverein
Fur Bergbau und Huttenbetrieb, 168 Misc. 872, 6 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (breach
of covenant on face of bonds). However, federal and many state courts have liberally
used the doctrine of constructive notice to uphold terms in the indenture. E.g., Dunham
v. Omaha & C.B. Street R.R., 106 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), re'ersing 25 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 661 (1940) ; Collier v. E. C. Miller Cedar Lumber Co., 13
Wash.2d 201, 124 P.2d 555 (1942). However, federal interpretation and remedies must
now conform to those of the states. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99 (1944).
Individual bondholders may be barred from a suit on the matured obligation by statutes
in some jurisdictions which allow only a foreclosure action unless the security has be-
come valueless. This action must be brought by the trustees or by a representative class
action. Haas v. Pacific Hotel Co. of San Francisco, 101 Cal. App.2d 783, 224 P.2d 783,
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 137 (1951) ; Fitkin v. Century Oil Co., 16 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1926);
also see 27 CoL. L. REv. 443, 449 (1927).
18. See note 14 su pra.
[Vol. 621100
NOTES
has an "adverse interest," i.e., one that conflicts with its responsibilities under
the indenture. 19
Recently, in Rabinowitz v. KaLrcr-Frazcr Corp.Y3° a bondholder sued the
corporation directly and attempted to circunvent a "no action" clause with
the claim that the trustee had an adverse interest. The original issuer of the
bonds, Graham-Paige, had agreed to make annual payments of twenty-five
percent of its net profits into a sinking fund for the bondholders. To protect
the bondholders in the event of a sale of all or a substantial part of Graham-
Paige's assets, the indenture required the purchaser of such assets to assume
all covenants and to execute an indenture satisfactory to the trustee. Kaiser-
Frazer purchased the automotive assets of Graham-Paige and promised to pay
the interest on the bonds as it accrued and the debt upon maturity. But the
purchaser refused to assume the sinking fund obligation. The trustee, Bank
of America, assented to this arrangement, and subsequently made a loan to
Kaiser-Frazer. This loan was to be amortized by twenty-five percent of
Kaiser-Frazer's net profits. The Graham-Paige indenture agreement con-
tained a "no action" clause, barring bondholder suits against the debtor un-
less bondholders representing twenty-five percent of the amount of the issue
requested the trustee to act and the trustee failed to do so. The owner of
$10,000 worth of bonds representing one-eighth of one percent of the out-
standing bonds brought a true class action for all bondholders against Kaiser-
Frazer in order to obtain specific performance of the covenant to maintain
the sinking fund. Defendant moved to dismiss on grounds that the "no action"
clause barred suit and the bondholder's proper remedy, if any, was to proceed
for a substitute trustee. The trustee, Bank of America, was not joined as
party defendant since it was outside the jurisdiction.2 1
The New York Supreme Court upheld the complaint against Kaiser-Frazer.
It pointed out that Bank of America, as trustee, "was charged with the duty
of requiring Kaiser-Frazer to assume the sinking fund."22 By virtue of the
trustee's loans to Kaiser-Frazer, the trustee had assumed a conflicting status
of creditor and, in self-interest because of its creditor status, had assented
to Kaiser-Frazer's non-maintenance of the sinking fund. On these facts the
court found that it would be futile to request Bank of America to act, and
wasteful to insist on a suit for a new trustee. Since the bondholders' interests
19. Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254 Fed. 560 (8th Cir. 1910) (trustee being
paid its debts which are junior to the issue for which it is trustee) ; Cochran v. Pitts-
burg S. & N.R.R., 150 Fed. 682 (C.C.V.D.N.Y. 1907) (trustee both holds bonds and
represents bondholders under another issue) ; Myers v. American National Bank & Trust
Co., 277 IIL App. 378 (1934) (interloddng officers and consenting to payment of junior
liens); Townsend v. Milaca Motors Co., 194 Afinn. 426, 250 N.V. 525 (1935). For a
general discussion see: Hearings before Subcommittee of Comnittee On Baning a:d
Currency on S. 477, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 180-3 (1939).
20. -Misc.-, 111 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
21. The facts of the case appear id. at 540-4.
22. Id. at 546.
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were impaired, the trustee "incompetent" to act, and the case already before
the court, the trustee's adverse interest was held to justify the direct suit
against the debtor despite the presence of the "no action" clause. 23 However,
the holding as to what constituted the adverse interest of the trustee is not
entirely clear. On the one hand, the opinion may be read to indicate that a
trustee who is a creditor of the corporate debtor thereby automatically ac-
quires interests that conflict with those of the bondholders.2" Alternatively,
the court states that it was Bank of America's consent to non-assumption of
the sinking fund, against the background of the loan, that placed it in a
position antagonistic to the bondholders' interests.25
In so far as the finding of adverse interest rested solely upon the trustee's
creditor status, the Rabinowitz holding substantially broadens the adverse
interest exception to the operation of the "no action" clause. A trustee's loan
to a corporate debtor has never, in itself, justified a direct suit against the
corporate debtor.20 Any adverse interest thus created has served to justify
the bondholder suit only where the trustee's actions were found unreason-
able2 7 and where the bondholders were in danger of imminent harm.28 Never-
23. Id. at 546-7.
24. "[A]s a bank creditor and in its self-interest Bank of America gave its express
written consent . . .whereby Kaiser-Frazer . . . did not assume the obligations of the
Sinking Fund. . . ." Id. at 546. But see note 49 infra.
25. "[W]hen Bank of America consented to Kaiser-Frazer's declination of assuming
any of the provisions of the Indenture, including the sinking fund provisions, it placed
itself in a position which was antagonistic to ... the interests of the debenture holders,"
Ibid.
26. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U.S. 605, 613 (1879) (direct action refused: some
trustees owned bonds of the issue represented and another trustee was a general creditor) ;
Rodman v. Richfield Oil Co., 66 F.2d 244, 251 (9th Cir. 1933) (direct action in form of
intervention refused: trustee a general creditor). In all other cases where direct action
was permitted and the trustee was a creditor of the obligor, factors other than the creditor
status apparently influenced the result. See e.g., note 27 hifra.
27. Where the actions of the trustee were reasonable, even though it was a creditor
of the obligor, courts have niot permitted direct actions. Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U.S.
605 (1879) ; Rodman v. Richfield Oil Co., 66 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1933). In cases where
the trustee has been a creditor of the obligor, direct action has been permitted only where
there were additional adverse interests or the facts indicated bad faith. E.g., Brown v.
Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254 Fed. 560 (8th Cir. 1918) (majority bondholders paying
off junior debts to trustee and themselves) ; Cochran v. Pittsburg S. & N.R.R., 150 Fed.
682 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1907) (trustee under more than one indenture); First Wisconsin
Nat. Bank v. Brynwood Land Co., 245 Wis. 610, 15 N.W.2d 840 (1944) (trustee conspir-
ing with majority bondholders).
None of the cases that the New York Court relies upon deals with the specific problem
of the trustee being a creditor of the obligor. One explanation is undoubtedly the paucity
of cases dealing with this precise point. Many more cases deal with the issue of the
trustee's liability or whether the trustee should receive preferential treatment as a result
of its creditor status. However, even here there must be some indication of unreasonable
actions or bad faith. E.g., York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (Zd Cir), rcv'd on
other grownds, 326 U.S. 99 (1944) (trustee's unreasonable delay in not taking action to
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theless, despite the fact that neither a trustee loan nor assent to non-main-
tenance of a sinking fund have ever been considered unreasonable per se,0
the New York court made no inquiry-not even a pretense of investigation-
into the reasonableness of the trustee's actions. And, presumably, the cor-
porate debtor had no opportunity to invoke the "no action" clause by offering
proof that all transactions between the trustee and itself were, at least on their
face, reasonable. At the same time, there was no evidence indicating that
harm was imminent-ample time seemed available for the bondholders to
make appropriate request upon the trustee for action, or to bring suit for a
substitute trustee.30
prevent further impairment of the security) ; Dunn v. Reading Trust, 121 F2d 854 (3d
Cir. 1941) (loans in form of interest payments inducing bondholders to believe their
security was adequate) ; First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Ricketts, 75 F.2d 309 (Sth Cir.
1934) (trustee, as creditor, purchases property at foreclosure sale instituted by itself as
trustee) ; 'Marshall v. Lovell, 19 F.2d 751 (Sth Cir. 1927) (one of the trustees received
a secret profit for securing a ratification of an agreement favorable to the obligor) ; Mar-
shall & Ilsley Bank v. Guarantee Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N.V. 862 (1933) (failure
to notify bondholders of a default) ; Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 237
N.Y. Supp. 541 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (dictum: loans plus accepting substitution of securities
of less value as collateral under the indenture). But cf. Anderson v. Pennsylvania Hotel
Co., 56 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1932).
28. See e.g., Buel v. Baltimore & O.S.W. Ry., 24 lisc. 646, 53 N.Y. Supp. 749 (Sup.
Ct. 1898) (continuous diversion of net earnings to junior lienors) ; Cochran v. Pittsburg
S. & N.R.R., 150 Fed. 683 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1907) (foreclosure imperative remedy and
trustee does not forclose) ; First Wisconsin Nat. Bank v. Bry-nwood Land Co., 245 Vis.
610, 15 N.W.2d 840 (1944) (same); Townsend v. Milaca Motors Co., 194 Minn. 426,
260 N.WX. 525 (1935) (same). See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F2d 503 (2d Cir.),
rez'd on other groufms, 326 U.S. 99 (1944) (trustee used its position to better its creditor
status and took no affirmative steps to protect bondholders).
The danger that a trustee will use its position to better its standing as a creditor has
been greatly mitigated by § 311 of the Trust Indentu'e Act, which prevents a trustee from
improving its own creditor position within four months prior to a default in principal or
interest under the indenture. If its creditor standing has been improved, the trustee must
distribute the proceeds ratably between itself and the bondholders to the extent of the
unsecured portion of the bondholders' claim. 53 STAT. 1161 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 771:1:
(1946). Mlinor credit transactions such as discounting notes are exempted by this section.
See Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 430-1; Hearings before Subco,;:mittee of Commiltee oil
Banking and Currency on S.2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1937) ; SEIn. R--r. No. 248,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1939).
29. Direct action has not been permitted in New York for breach of a covenant to
maintain a sinking fund. E.g., Relmar Holding Co. v. Paramount Public Corp., 147 IMisc.
824, 263 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct), aff'd without opinion, 237 App. Div. 870, 261 N.Y.
Supp. 959 (1st Dep't 1933) ; Krause v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 172 Misc. 2, 14 N.Y.S2d
206 (Mun. Ct. 1939). See also, Block v. Mansfield Min. & Smelting Co., 23 F. Supp.
700 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) ; Goldstein v. Childs Co., 264 App. Div. 793, 35 N.Y.S2d 204 (1st
Dept 1942). But cf. Barnes v. United Steel Workers Corp., 11 N.Y.S2d 161 (Sup. Ct.
1939). Trustee's loans to an obligor are not unreasonable per se. See note 27 mspra.
30. The New York court rested its opinion on cases involving foreclosure actions.
However, this is merely another illustration of the imminent harm rationale. Courts in
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Conceivably, however, the case may fall into an adverse interest category
distinguishable from the cases above. When a trustee is placed in a position
in which it must inevitably harm, by any action, one of the interests it repre-
sents, courts have applied the adverse interest theory without a showing of
unreasonableness or imminent harm. Thus, for example, where a trustee repre-
sented several classes of bondholders under different indentures executed by
the same obligor, a direct bondholder suit against the debtor was permitted
since the trustee could take no action without favoring one class and thereby
breaching its obligations to others.3 ' In Rabinowitz, the court may have felt
the situation was analogous. From the contemporaneousness of the loan and
the trustee's assent to non-maintenance of the sinking fund, the court apparent-
ly inferred that the assent was part of the bargain in which the loan was
obtained.3 2 And, if the assent were a condition of obtaining the loan, the
trustee could not act without injuring either itself or the bondholders. Even
here, however, the holding in Rabinowitz is an extension of prior case law.
Previously, except where the obligor was also trustee,3 similar applications
of the adverse interest theory without a showing of unreasonableness or
imminent harm have all concerned a trustee who was trustee for two or more
groups whose interests conflicted; but where the conflict was between bond-
holders and the trustee's own self-interest, courts did not use an adverse
interest theory. Rather they permitted evasion of the "no action" clause only
upon a showing of bad faith or fraud. 4 This latter type of justification for
direct suit against the corporate debtor, in contrast to the adverse interest
the "foreclosure" type of action assume that (1) the trustee's interests are sufficiently
adverse so that it will not be able to act in the best interests of all the bondholders, and,
(2) the only remedy which will protect bondholders' interests is foreclosure. Since this
is the only remedy, direct action by bondholders is appropriate since it makes no difference
who institutes the proceedings. See foreclosure cases cited note 28 supra. But even here
some courts may insist on the trustee's removal rather than foreclosure. E.g., Florida
Nat Bank of Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123 Fla. 525, 167 So. 378
(1936).
However, in the instant case there appears to be no foundation for the imminent harm
rationale. There is some evidence that at the time that this action was instituted the
trustee had ceased to be a creditor of Kaiser-Frazer. Moovy's INvusvxIALS 1386-8
(1950). Therefore, since the trustee no longer has an adverse interest, an assumption
of continuing imminent harm is unwarranted. There is no reason why, if the claims of
the bondholders were reasonable, the trustee would not act.
31. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R.R., 66 Fed, 169 (E.D. Wis.
1895); Cochran v. Pittsburg S. & N.R.R., 150 Fed. 682 (C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1907); Myers
v. North American National Bank & Trust Co., 277 111. App. 378 (1934); see Hcaring.s
before Subcommittee of Coninittee on Banking and Currency on S. 2344, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25-6 (1937).
32. See note 25 supra.
33. E.g., Townsend v. Milaca Motor Co., 194 Minn. 423, 260 N.W. 525 (1935). Cl.
Fried v. Marburger, 353 Mo. 1146, 186 S.W.2d 584 (1945).
34. See cases cited note 27 su pra (trustee a creditor); cases cited note 19 tspra
(other adverse interests).
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rationale, dispensed with the prerequisite of imminent harm but required
an even more stringent investigation into the reasonableness of the trustee's
actions.35
The facts of the Rabinowitz case clearly indicate how the New York adverse
interest doctrine may now extend to situations in which no factual conflict
of interests exists. While it is true that the transactions involved in the
decision ,may have created a situation in which the trustee's interest was
inimical to those of the bondholders whom it represented, 0 whether the con-
flict of interests did in fact exist can only be determined by examining the
circumstances surrounding the transactions. If, for example, Kaiser-Frazer
did demand as a condition precedent to its borrowing from the Bank of
America instead of elsewhere that the latter, as trustee, assent to non-assump-
tion of the sinking fund, the trustee was indeed in a position where it had to
injure either itself or the bondholders it represented5 But both a loan and
the trustee's assent to non-maintenance of the fund may well have been the
only conditions on which Kaiser-Frazer would purchase Graham-Paige assets:
Graham-Paige was in considerable financial difficulty and the purchaser was
in excellent position to dictate many of the terms of sale.33 At the same time
there is some evidence, apparently not considered by the court, that the loan
and the sale were independent transactions with the loan occurring six months
after the sale agreement. 39 On either of these theories, the trustee conceiv-
ably had interests in almost complete conformity with those of the bond-
35. Rodman v. Richfield Oil Co., 66 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1933) ; Lauinger v. Carrillo
Bldg., 41 Cal. App.2d 660, 107 P.2d 287 (1940).
36. The complaint alleged "negligent and wilful misconduct' on the part of the Baitc
of America. Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp.,--Mfisc.-, 111 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (Sup.
Ct. 1952). However, the court did not consider this allegation in its opinion.
37. Of course, Bank of America might have acted solely to obtain Kaiser-Frazer's
business on favorable credit terms. But the fact that the loan and the sinking fund were
both secured by a percentage of net profits-apparently given some weight by the Court,
id. at 546-does not necessarily create an adverse interest situation. See note 41 infra.
38. In 1945, Graham-Paige's net profits were $1,030,571, while in 1946, there was a
net loss of $4,364,568. 1946 was Kaiser-Frazer's second year of business and therefore
its earning record is not meaningful. MooDY's INDusTMALs 3014 (1947). In 1947,
however, Kaiser-Frazer's "time charges earned" (ratio of assets to funded debt) was
29.28; the funded debt of Kaiser-Frazer consisted solely of the Graham-Paige debenture.
In 1947, Kaiser-Frazer's net profits were $19,015,678. Id. at 1504 (1948). It ,as not till
1949 that Kaiser-Frazer showed a loss, but its funded debt was still one-half of its assets.
Id. at 1386-7 (1950).
39. The contract of sale vras dated Dec. 12, 1946, the transfer of assets to become
effective as of February 10, 1947. 111 N.Y.S2d 539, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1952). The loan
agreement from Bank of America to Kaiser-Frazer vas dated June 30, 1947, and it pro-
vided for "loans" prior to Oct. 1, 1947 not to excecd an aggregate of $12,00,00. Mcoov's
IxNusTnALs 3015 (1947). There is no indication as to whether Kaiser-Frazer borrowed
to its permissible maximum; however, the New York Court apparently assumed the
entire loan to be a single transaction. 111 N.Y.S.2d 539, 546 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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holders. 40 In so far as the holding rested upon the trustee's creditor status,
and not upon any causal connection between assent to non-maintenance of
the fund and the making of the loan, a conflict of interests is clearly absent:
there is no evidence that the trustee might gain or lose in any way different
from the bondholders were the fund not maintained. 41 While situations might
arise in which a trustee's status as creditor does give rise to a conflict of
interests, as for example, where trustee and bondholders have liens on identi-
cal security and a question of priority is involved, 42 there seems to be no
factual basis for assuming the existence of an adverse interest in all situations
where the trustee is a creditor of the obligor.
The Rabinowitz doctrine permits a bondholder to circumvent the "no action"
clause where a trustee's actions are quite in accord with reasonable business
behavior. The extension of loans by a trustee to an obligor is a highly prev-
alent practice.43  Since the Federal Trust Indenture Act, applicable to all
issues over one million dollars, requires a trustee to be a corporation possess-
ing substantial assets, 44 the trustee function is usually fulfilled by a bank
with whom the obligor is accustomed to dealing. This past business relation-
ship, enhanced by the cooperation required between trustee and obligor, en-
courages a trustee to extend credit-especially distress loans.45 Thus if the
opinion signifies that the creditor status of the trustee is, in itself, an adverse
interest sufficient to justify direct suit, circumvention of the "no action" clause
40. See Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U.S. 605 (1879).
41. A conflict in interests does not necessarily exist between the trustee and the bond-
holders even though they are both secured by percentages of net profit. The bondholders
must receive their interest payments before Bank of America will receive part payment
on its loan out of net profits. Moreover, unless the earning power of Kaiser-Frazer was
thereby jeopardized, the existence of another agreement by Kaiser-Frazer to allocate an
additional twenty-five percent of its net profits would not harm the interests of the trustee
as creditor. Therefore, there would be no conflict unless a default was pending or actually
had occured. Even here, there might be no conflict of interests depending on such factors
as the amount of assets of Kaiser-Frazer, the remaining assets of Graham-Paige, and the
priority of liens. Even if the trustee had a prior lien it might be prorated with that of the
bondholders. E.g., Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Hackett, Hoff, & Thierman, 213 Wis. 426,
250 N.W. 867 (1933) ; see note 29 supra. But cf. Anderson v. Pennsylvania Hotel Co.,
56 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1932).
42. E.g., Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guarantee Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N.W.
862 (1933) ; First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Ricketts, 75 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1934).
43. See Note, 7 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 523 (1940); SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WoRx, Ac i Es, PERSONNEL AND REORGANIZATION COMMrI-Ems,
pt. VI, 99 (1936), and sources cited note 45 infra.
44. Section 310(a) (1) provides that at least one institutional trustee be an American
corporation which is subject to governmental supervision or examination with a combined
capital of $150,000 or more. 53 STAT. 1157 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (a) (1) (1946).
45. See Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee o Banking and Currency on
S. 2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-92, 119-21, 130, 133-41, 158-9 (1937); Hearings before
Subcommittee of Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 477, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
86-7, 97, 178-9, 202 (1939).
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may then occur not only where there may be no factual conflict of interests,
but also on grounds which constitute a normal event in the business world 4
At the same time, courts have recognized in the past that assent to breach
of an indenture covenant may be quite reasonable.47 That the assent and the
loan occur together in no way provides a sudden metamorphosis to unreason-
able action: depending upon the total factual context, the two events give rise
to any number of inferences regarding reasonableness. 48 Indeed, in the instant
case, there is some evidence that the trustee did exact some provision for
maintenance of a sinking fund for the bondholders.42 Patently, comparing
the earning power of Kaiser-Frazer and Graham-Paige, it would have been
ludicrous for bondholders to insist on security in the form of twenty-five per-
cent of Kaiser-Frazer's net profits. Perhaps, then, the substitute sinking fund
arrangement was quite reasonable. But the court apparently did not consider
it. And while the court may have concluded that the trustee's behavior was
unreasonable in view of all the circumstances in the case, its failure to make
this explicit and the presence of possibly valid business reasons explaining
the trustee's behavior create a rationale permitting direct suits where a trustee
may exercise eminently sound business judgment50
When a trustee's interests do conflict with those of the bondholders whom
it represents, bondholders possess a battery of remedies to protect themselves.
Of course, in the first instance, the bondholder who complies with the requisites
of the "no action" clause may always police his debtor by direct suit. The
46. Recently, clauses have been inserted into the indenture giving the trustee an ex-
press power to lend to the obligor. E.g., York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 143
F.2d 503, 514 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 326 U.S. 99 (1944); Dabney v. Chase Nat. Bank, 196
F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Dudley v. 'Mealey, 147 F2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1945). How-
ever, as in the York case, supra, the clause was interpreted strictly as an exculpatory
clause. This case involved the liability of the trustee for its negligence and bad faith in
not foreclosing. The granting of the loan evidenced bad faith. However, none of these
decisions indicate what the effect of these clauses will be on attempts to bring a direct
action.
47. See notes 27, 29 supra.
48. See text at notes 37-41 supra.
49. MooDY's in 1948 indicates that an agreement existed betveen Kaiser-Frazer and
Grabam-Paige whereby the former agreed to reimburse annual sinking fund payments
made by Graham-Paige up to $300,000 pursuant to the indenture. Kaiser-Frazer further
agreed to give its unsecured notes for any payments in excess of $300,000. Mo~an's Iz.-
DUSTRiALS 1505 (1948). This fact was not mentioned in the 1947 edition of McoDyfs, nor
by the New York Court in its opinion. This arrangement appears to have continued.
Id. at 2441 (1949) ; id. at 1387 (1950). Also see note 33 supra.
50. Loans by a trustee were considered as a possible adverse interest, but were re-
jected by Congress, in the drafting of the Trust Indenture Act. See Hearings before
Subcommittee of Comnmittee on Banking and Currency on S. 2344, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
18-19, 27-8, 55-61 (1937) ; Hearings before Subcomnittee of Conmillee on Banking and
Currency on S. 477, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-9, 179-35 (1939) ; Snx. RE:P. No. 248, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 20-23 (1939) ; H.R. REP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-5, 47-9,
80-4 (1939).
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Trust Indenture Act, by providing for periodic reports by the obligor and by
the trustee,5 ' including the names and addresses of all present bondholders, 2
greatly facilitates such compliance. Assuming, however, that even with this
assistance, compliance is impossible or not timely, other remedies are at the
bondholders' command. A bondholder may intervene in an action between
trustee and obligor if there is some indication that the trustee may not fairly
represent the bondholders.53  Additionally, the Trust Indenture Act makes
the mere existence of certain specified adverse interests a ground for an action
to remove the trustee.5 4 The action will lie where, for example, the trustee:
is a trustee under more than one indenture of the obligor; owns more than a
specified percentage of the obligor's securities; has mutual officers or directors
with the obligor.55 And at common law, especially more recently, existence
of any one of an even broader catalog of adverse interests is apparently a
ground for removal.50 At the same time, should the trustee's adverse interest
51. Section 314(a) provides for periodic reports by the obligor to the trustee. 53
STAT. 1167 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(a) (1946).
Section 313 (a) provides for periodic reports to the bondholder by the trustee. 53 STAT.
1165 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm(a) (1946).
52. See note 16 mpra.
53. See In re Central of Georgia Ry., 55 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ga. 1944) ; Campbell v.
Hudson & Manhattan Ry., 277 App. Div. 731, 102 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 302
N.Y. 902, 100 N.E.2d 183 (1951). But cf. Angevine v. City of Sesser, 39 F. Supp, 498,
501 (E.D. Ill. 1941) (no absolute right of intervention, and it will not be permitted unless
there is sufficient cause) ; Central States Life Ins. v. Koplar Co., 80 F.2d 754 (8th Cir.
1935) (no intervention permitted even though intervenor owned almost all the bonds).
54. If the trustee has any of the adverse interests enumerated in § 310(b), note 55
infra, it must resign, and upon its failure to do so, any bona fide holder of indenture
securities for at least six months may sue for the trustee's removal. 53 STAT. 1158 (1939),
15 U.S.C. §77jjj(b) (1946). The provisions of §310(b) have been interpreted as
exhaustive by the S.E.C.'s General Counsel. Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 427-8. The
only provision for civil liability in the Trust Indenture Act is for the filing of false docu-
ments. Section 323(a), 53 STAT. 1176 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §77www(a) (1946). Section
309(d) specifically exempts the trustee from liability if the indenture fails to conform with
the Act. 53 STAT. 1157 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §77iii(d) (1946). See Loss, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 1040-2.
55. The remaining adverse interests proscribed by the Act are: trustee is an under-
writer for the obligor; trustee controls or is controlled by the obligor; trustee, through
a default, owns more than a specified percentage of the securities of any person who con-
trols the obligor; or trustee has substantial adverse interests in the outside debts of the
obligor. The Act also provides for specific exceptions to these generalizations of the
proscribed adverse interests, e.g., securities owned as testamentary trustee. 53 STAT. 1158
(1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (b) (1946). See Loss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 426-30; Goodbar,
Bond Trustees as Statutory Trustees, 28 B.U.L. REV. 399, 418-21 (1948) ; Note, 7 U. or
Cm. L. REv. 523 (1940) ; SEN. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1939).
56. More recent dicta in cases where direct action has been denied indicate that the
proper remedy is a petition for removal of the trustee. E.g., Central West Public Service
v. Craig, 70 F.2d 427, 434 (8th Cir. 1934) (foreclosure action); Florida Nat. Bank of
Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123 Fla. 525, 542, 167 So. 378, 385
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affect his behavior, bondholders may recover from the trustee in suits for
damages resulting from fraud, bad faith, or negligence.57
Extension of the adverse interest exception to the "no action" clause is
totally unnecessary to protect bondholders. Admittedly, in extreme circum-
stances, alternatives to direct suit against the corporate debtor may be in-
adequate. A removal suit may not repair actions already undertaken nor a
damage suit make all parties whole. Here, however, courts have already gone
(1936) (trustee unjustly refusing to take action on its own initiative occupies a position
hostile to minority security holders or conspires against them) ; Fried v. Marburger, 353
Mo. 1146, 1153, 186 SAV.2d 584, 587 (1945) (trustee and obligor same person).
In the past, however, courts have been reluctant to remove a trustee without notice
to it and affording it an opportunity to be heard. E.g., Ettlinger v. Schumacher, 142 N.Y.
189, 36 N.E. 1055 (1894). Inability to join the trustee because it was outside the juris-
diction may have influenced the court in Rabinowitz to entertain the direct action rather
than insist on removal. Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer,-%Misc.-, 111 N.Y.S2d 539, 546
(Sup. Ct. 1952). One writer has stated that removal is the "most drastic preventive
remedy available . . . [and] should require a greater degree of misconduct than any
[other] remedy.. . ." Posner, supra note 2, at 777. Moreover, where it is obvious to a
court that the remedies necessary to protect the rights of the bondholders, such as fore-
closure, will be under judicial supervision, it will consider appointment of a new trustee
as a wasteful and unnecessary delay. See note 30 supra.
57. Usually an indenture trustee is held to the standards imposed upon an ordinary
trustee. E.g., Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 6M9, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Palmer, Trustee-
ship Under the Trust Indenture, 41 Cor. L. REv. 193, 201-7 (1941) (comparison between
indenture trustee and family trustee). The liability of the trustee, however, is restricted
if it is considered a mere stake-holder under a contract. Then the trustee may not have
to assume certain obligations which are ordinarily imposed upon a trustee by operation
of law. See, e.g., Ainsa v. Mercantile Co., 174 CaL 504, 510, 163 Pac. 893, 900 (1917) ;
Posner, supra note 2, at 739. At least one commentator contends that the two theories of
standards create no difference in fact 2 BoGAnr, TnuTsr AM TRUSTEMs §246 (1953).
Trustee was held liable in: York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.),
rev'd on other gronds, 326 U.S. 99 (1944) (failure of trustee to use a power conferred
on it by the indenture) ; Richardson v. Union Mortgage Co., 210 Iowa 346, 228 NAV. 103
(1930) (permitting substitution of less valuable securities) ; Harvey v. Guaranty Trust
Co. of N.Y., 134 Misc. 417, 236 N.Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 229
App. Div. 774, 242 N.Y. Supp. 920 (1st Dep't 1929) (trustee exceeded scope of his
powers). Some courts have held that no right of action exists against a trustee where
the plaintiff became a bondholder after the date of the trustee's actions which give rise
to its liability. This is based on the theory that no fiduciary relatiunship could then have
been in existence. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.F
574 (1930). See also Corbin, The Subsequent Bondholder and the Delinquent Truice,
51 Co. L. REv. 813 (1951) ; Note, 66 HAm'. L REv. 1127 (1953).
The use of exculpatory clauses in the indenture absolving the trustee from negligence,
e.g., willful default or specific acts of neglect, discouraged the use of the damage action.
See, e.g., Hazzard v. Chicago National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y. Supp. 541 (Sup.
Ct 1936). Posner, supra note 2, at 781-90. However, § 315(d) of the Trust Indenture
Act prohibits the insertion of exculpatory clauses in the indenture except in regard to
errors of judgment made by any responsible officer in good faith without negligence, or
to actions contrary to the direction of bondholders. 53 STAT. 1171 (1939), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ooo(d) (1946). See SEN. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-6 (1939).
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a long way toward safeguarding bondholders: whenever a trustee's actual or
impending actions have been unreasonable and bondholders are thereby in-
jured or threatened with harm, direct suits have always been permitted
whether upon an adverse interest or any other rationale. But where a trustee
with an adverse interest neither threatens nor has done anything unreasonable,
or where there is ample time to avoid injury from even unreasonable trustee
action, a suit for removal is more than adequate to protect bondholdersY8
Indeed, if the trustee's interest is really adverse, the removal action may ulti-
mately be brought anyway. Absent pressing circumstances, then, it is difficult
to conceive why courts should express solicitude for bondholders to the extent
of undermining the objectives of the "no action" clause.59
Direct actions, despite "no action" clauses, originated prior to the Trust
Indenture Act 60 and at a time when alternative remedies had not fully
developed to protect bondholders. Yet, in the face of more recent develop-
ments, the New York court has anomalously broadened the grounds for direct
suit to include situations in which a trustee's actions may be reasonable, a
trustee's interests not adverse, and bondholders not in danger of imminent
harm. Wrong on its reading of precedent, wrong on its rationale, the
Rabinowitz case is an outdated expression of solicitude for the bondholder.
58. In several cases involving liability of the trustee or attempts to annul the actions
of a trustee, suit was brought by a new trustee, indicating that this remedy has been used.
E.g., First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Ricketts, 75 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1934); Marshall &
Ilsley Bank v. Guarantee Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N.W. 862 (1933).
59. See text at notes 36-41, 49 supra. There is a possibility, for example, that the
holding in the Rabinowitz case might result in harm to the Graham-Paige bondholders
as a class. Kaiser-Frazer might argue that it assumed that, in case of a sale, the trustee
had power to delete any covenants it chose, that the loan was an independent transaction,
and that there was no collusion between Kaiser-Frazer and the trustee. The corporation
might further argue that if it had been or should now be required to assume the original
covenant, instead of the substitute agreement containing such less onerous sinking fund
obligations as it apparently later assumed, it would rather rescind the contract. As long
as this is a possibility, no matter how tenuous, the majority of bondholders might prefer
the existing agreement rather than chance the loss of all benefits from that agreement.
Permitting a direct action here ignores the fact that "no action" clauses protect the will
of the majority of bondholders rather than the wishes of an individual, no matter how
important his financial stake may be to him.
60. Direct actions date back to the 19th century, Ettlinger v. Schumacher, 142 N.Y.
189, 36 N.E. 1055 (1894), while the Trust Indenture Act was passed in 1939. 53 STAr.
1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1946).
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